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ARLINGTON HEIGHTS: PLANNING FOR
A SEGREGATED COMMUNITY
The need for public housing' has produced a major dilemma in
today's large metropolitan areas.2 The lack of adequate housing in the
central cities3 and the availability of vacant land in the suburbs4 has
made the suburbs ideal locations for the construction of low-income
housing.5 Such construction, however, has been strongly resisted by
these predominantly white communities. Litigants, relying on the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, 6 have chal-
1. The housing needs of the United States can be viewed in two ways. The first is to
compare the income of the families and the cost of housing. This produces an estimate of
"noneffective demand households" or those families who are unable to afford adequate
housing. According to United States Housing Needs; 1968-1978 (TEMPO, General
Electric's Center for Advanced Studies), prepared for the President's Committee on
Urban Housing, by 1978, 7.7% of white families and 18.3% of black families will fall into
this category. The Committee estimates "that six to eight million families must be
receiving housing assistance by 1978, if all Americans are to be living in decent housing
by that time." PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, THE REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING-A DECENT HOME 40-42 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as THE KAISER REPORT]. The second is to look at the condition of housing itself. The
1970 Census defined adequate housing as having full indoor plumbing facilities and
found 4,668,303 inadequate housing units. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL
HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS-UNITED STATES SUMMARY Table 1 (1971). They also found
that 1,028,291 units were overcrowded (in excess of 1.5 persons per room). Id. at Table 4.
2. The problem affects the total region including the suburban communities. This is
due to the outward pressure exerted by the expanding city population. E. HOOVER & R.
VERNON, ANATOMY OF A METROPOLIS 190-92 (1959) cited in Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HAtv. L. REV. 1645 (1971). See G. BEYER, HOUSING
AND SOCIETY 360-61 (1965). In addition to the actual physical pressure, there is a social
responsibility with which the suburbs must deal. See Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the
Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509 (1971).
3. "By 1978 . . . about 60 percent (4.5 million) of all families expected to require
housing assistance will be urban dwellers." United States Housing Needs; 1968-1978
(TEMPO, General Electric's Center for Advanced Studies) cited in THE KAISER REPORT,
note I supra, at 7.
4. THE KAISER REPORT, note I supra, at 138-40.
5. In addition to being merely a more attractive choice, the use of land in the suburbs
may be a necessity. "Regardless of the extent to which the nation chooses to tear down
the central cities and rebuild them, a large share of the new housing, including subsidized
housing, developed in the coming decade will have to be located outside of central
cities." Id. at 140.
6. See notes 23-27 and 29-36 infra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
lenged the apparently exclusionary zoning practices used to keep low
income housing out of suburbia.7
The United States Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 8 held that evidence of the
racially segregated nature of the Chicago metropolitan area, 9 and the
lack of affirmative action by the village of Arlington Heights to al-
leviate this problem 0 did not constitute an equal protection violation. "
Specifically, the village refused a request to rezone an area to allow for
multi-family housing12 on the grounds that such a rezoning would result
in a decline in the property values of adjoining areas and would
undermine the integrity of their zoning plan. 13 The village's plan called
for multi-family housing to be used only as a buffer between single-
family homes and commercial or manufacturing districts. ' 4 On these
facts the Supreme Court found that no discriminatory motivation was
7. Exclusionary practices often consist of: large lot zoning which reduces the number
of lots subject to development and raises the overall cost of the land; minimum house
size regulations which are unrelated to the number of occupants or health and safety
standards; single-family zoning in order to exclude less expensive multi-family units;
spot-zoning small sections for multi-family housing, such as the buffer policy used in
Arlington Heights (see text accompanying note 14 infra); discretionary permits or
variances which allow community officials to select desired land uses and reject others
which may take the form of building permits and sewer connection permits. See general-
ly Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls,
22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 509, 520-22 (1971); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land
Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475,481-85
(1971).
8. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
9. The population of Arlington Heights was 64,884 in 1970 and of that number, 27
residents were black. The four-township northwest Cook County area increased by
219,000 people between 1960 and 1970 and that increase included only 170 blacks. During
this ten-year period, the percentage of blacks decreased in the suburban areas while it
increased within the City of Chicago. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1975).
10. "The Village had no other current plans for building low and moderate income
housing." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
260 (1977). The court of appeals found that Arlington Heights had been "ignoring" and
"exploiting the problem." Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1975).
11. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,270
(1977).
12. Id. at 258.
13. Id.
14. As a result of this decision, such a buffer policy, if uniformly administered, may
provide a method of exclusionary planning which would escape judicial invalidation. See
note 55 and accompanying text infra.
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ARLINGTON HEIGHTS
shown and thus no violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment had occurred.15
The success of challenges to apparent exclusionary practices under
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution has turned on
whether the practice involves a fundamantal interest 6 or a suspect
class. 7 Either of these showings triggers the strict scrutiny standard of
review 8 which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant by requiring
a showing of a compelling governmental interest to justify the action. 19
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lindsey v. Normet ° that the
right to housing does not constitute a fundamental interest, a plaintiff
challenging exclusionary zoning must prove that a suspect class is
involved. Although a showing of racial discrimination is sufficient to
invoke strict scrutiny 2l a review of prominent cases in this area shows
15. To this extent, the Court followed their earlier decision in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), which held that racially discriminatory motivation must be proved.
The Court found that the "[r]espondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving
that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision." Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977).
16. Fundamental interests consist of constitutionally guaranteed rights or those rights
necessary in a democratic society. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 254-56 (1974), Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618, 629-34 (1969) (travel); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-37 (1972), Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706
(1969), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-34 (1969), Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668-70 (1966), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-62 (1964)
(voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 533, 541 (1942) (procreation); Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-99 (1972) (free speech); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (rights under criminal
procedure).
17. Suspect classes include: alienage, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,372
(1971); national origin, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215, 216
(1944); Hirabayaschi v. United States 320 U.S. 81 (1943); race, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); and possibly sex, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 682 (1973) (plurality holding sex suspect). See generally Johnston, Sex Discrimina-
tion and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.. 617 (1974).
18. Strict scrutiny review is the counterpart of the rational relation test under the two-
tiered approach to equal protection. See generally Developments-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
19. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Dunn v. Blums-
tein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
20. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
21. See note 17 supra.
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that the courts have differed as to the degree of proof necessary to
establish such a case.22
In James v. Valtierra,23 the Supreme Court found that a California
law requiring a public referendum to approve the building of low-
income housing was not a violation of the equal protection clause.
Since the referendum was required for all such housing, not only those
which were to be occupied by racial minorities, the plaintiffs estab-
lished only that the law had a greater impact on the poor.24 The Court
held that mere disproportionate impact was not sufficient to prove
discrimination under the fourteenth amendment.25 In cases following
Valtierra this holding became authority for the principle that proof of a
disproportionate impact on a minority group would not invalidate an
otherwise neutral law or act. 26 Other courts, however, have found the
Valtierra analysis inappropriate where additional evidence of discrimi-
nation exists.27
In Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna,28 the
city initially refused to rezone a parcel of land to allow construction of
low-income housing. After agreeing to rezone, the city then declared a
22. See notes 27, 36 and accompanying text infra.
23. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
24. Id. at 141.
25. Id. at 143.
26. In Citizens Comm. for Farraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974),
New York City's Housing and Development Administration decided to terminate a
proposed. project which would have consisted of 80% middle-income housing and 20%
low-income housing. This action was found to be a political response to local opposition
but not racially motivated. The court found that the cancelled "project was only one of
many city housing projects." Id. at 1070. They also noted the distinction between the
city cancelling its own project and a situation where the city prevents a private party
from building low-income housing. Here, "[t]he money tentatively allocated to the
Faraday Wood project would be available for another housing project. In contrast, when
a private developer is prevented from building public housing in a city, no such housing
whatever is provided to the city's residents." Id. In Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills,
503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974), a large-lot zoning ordinance which prevented the
construction of low-income housing was challenged. The complaining party, however,
had not even applied for a zoning variance. In addition to this the court found that
"[appellants failed to show that adequate low-cost housing was unavailable elsewhere
. . . in areas accessible to appellants' jobs and social services." Id. at 254. The court in
Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974) found no
pattern of discrimination and nothing from which to infer discrimination. Id. at 1094. See
also Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974); English v. Town of
Huntington, 448 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1971).
27. This occurred in cases where more than a mere disproportionate impact could be
shown but a clear showing of motivation was difficult to prove. See note 34 infra.
28. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
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sewer connection moratorium in order to prevent the project from
being built.29 On these facts the Second Circuit found an equal protec-
tion violation30 by analyzing the city's action in light of its historical
context and ultimate effect.31 Under this analysis the court looked to
the chronology of events and found that Lackawanna's actions were
guided by "racial motivation resulting in invidious discrimination.''32
The court went on to say, however, that even if the discrimination
"resulted from thoughtlessness rather than a purposeful scheme, the
city may not escape responsibility for placing its black citizens under a
severe disadvantage which it cannot justify. 33 This dicta was followed
in a number of lower federal court cases which held that proof of a
discriminatory effect was sufficient to establish the existence of racial
discrimination. 34
29. Although the sewer system was found to be "grossly deficient," the city had done
nothing previously to remedy the situation. Instead, they had allowed other subdivisions
to tie into its sewer system, and a sewer connection moratorium in 1967 had lasted less
than 100 days. Id. at 114.
30. Id.
31. This analysis was approved by the Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967). The case involved an equal protection challenge to an amendment to the
California Constitution which allowed for private discrimination in the sale, lease, or
rental of real property. The Court found that a case by case analysis was needed and that
the Supreme Court of California "properly undertook to examine the constitutionality
E [of the amendment] in terms of its 'immediate objective,' its 'ultimate effect' and its
'historical context and the conditions existing prior to its enactment.'" Id. at 373.
32. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 109 (2d Cir.
1970). The court stated that "[tlhe pattern is an old one and exists in many of our
communities but appears to be somewhat more subtle in Lackawanna. However, when
the chronology of events is considered, the discrimination is clear." Id. at 109-10.
33. Id. at 114.
34. In the majority of these cases the historical context indicated at least a question-
able sequence of events leading to the discriminatory act. See United States v. City of
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). Although
this case was a Title VIII case, it was handled in a manner similar to the equal protection
cases. In Black Jack residents of an unincorporated area, after learning that low-income
housing was to be built in the vicinity, incorporated the city and rezoned the project site
in order to exclude the housing. When the area, now Black Jack, was unincorporated it
was governed by St. Louis County and zoned for multi-family construction. The action
by the residents came swiftly and indicated their motivating force. United Farmworkers
of Florida Hous. Project v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974), concern-
ed a refusal by the city to allow a sewer connection or to make an exception to their
annexation rule. The facts showed that in many previous instances such actions were
readily taken. In Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972), the city had initially
granted a building permit but then denied the permit after learning that the planned
project was for low-income housing. However, while each of the preceding cases dealt
with somewhat colorable actions, they all stated the more liberal rule that a showing of
racially discriminatory effect was enough to establish a prima facie case. See also Banks
v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
1977]
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The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,35 expanded the doctrine used in
the cases following Lackawanna. Although the court adhered to the
Valtierra holding that disproportionate impact alone does not establish
a case of discrimination, the court found a discriminatory effect 36 from
facts which had not previously been sufficient for such a showing.37
Although the discriminatory effect standard had previously required
some showing from which motivation could be inferred, 38 this opinion
indicated that such additional facts may not be needed. The analysis,
as applied by the Seventh Circuit, used the equal protection clause to
require all municipalities in the metropolitan area to share the burden
of meeting metropolitan housing needs.39
There were, however, instances where disproportionate impact alone seemed to be
sufficient to prove a violation. In Joseph Skillken and Co. v. City of Toledo, 380 F.
Supp. 228 (N.D. Ohio 1974), and Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 355
F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1973), the respective district courts found discriminatory
effect from the racially segregated patterns of the cities' and the communities' refusal to
allow the building of low-income housing. These decisions were, however, subsequently
reversed. Joseph Skillken and Co. v. City of Toledo, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975);
Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975).
Despite seemingly conflicting results, the different factual settings of the Valtierra
and Lackawanna cases enable the two to be reconciled. See text accompanying notes 23
and 28 supra. Cases in which the governmental action appeared to be neutral and only a
disproportionate impact could be shown followed the Valtierra decision and found no
violation. See note 26 supra. When the events surrounding the governmental action
evidenced a possible discriminatory motivation, the courts used the historical context,
ultimate effect analysis of Lackawanna to find what they called a discriminatory effect.
Although disproportionate impact and discriminatory effect are semantically related, the
Lackawanna discriminatory effect standard applied only where some discriminatory
motivation could be inferred from the historical context. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461
F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) provides an example of such an inference in a challenge against
the town for failing to provide equal municipal services to lower-income areas of the
town. The court cited Lackawanna and then noted that the facts supported a "rea-
sonable and logical inference that there was here neglect involving clear overtones of
racial discrimination .... " Id. at 1173.
35. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
36. Discriminatory effect as used here refers to its use in the Lackawanna line of
cases. See text accompanying notes 28-34, infra.
37. The court looked to the segregated nature of the Chicago area and stated: "Thus
the rejection of [the housing project] has the effect of perpetuating both this residential
segregation and Arlington Heights' failure to accept any responsibility for helping to
solve this problem." 517 F.2d at 414. The court goes on to state that: "[M]erely because
Arlington Heights did not directly create the problem does not necessarily mean that it
can ignore it." Id.
38. See note 34 supra.
39. The Seventh Circuit's decision indicated that all that was needed to compel the
building of low-income housing in the suburbs was evidence of the racially segregated
[Vol. 14:307
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Arlington Heights40
recognized that the standard of review under the fourteenth amend-
ment had shifted from a finding of strict discriminatory effect4' to a
more lenient standard and, after disposing of the standing issue,4 2 held
nature of a city and the lack of affirmative remedial action by a suburb. This type of
requirement closely parallels the approach used by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
Regional considerations would place a fair share burden on suburban communities to
help alleviate the housing problem. A fair share approach would consider:
1. Existing need of the town
2. Amount of employment and number of non-residents employed in the town
3. Future employment and amount of land zoned to provide employment
4. Adequacy of public services for new development
5. Ecological soundness of development
6. Ability of the town to economically support low-income housing
7. The policy of equalizing the distribution of income groups
8. Varying types of regional contributions by towns with low-density, low
employment and little developmental pressure
9. Varying length of travel to work among different income groups
10. Other local, state, or county plans.
These concerns would aid in providing for a practical and equitable distribution of
housing needs in order to provide for the general welfare of the total regional area.
Williams, On From Mount Laurel: Guidelines on the "Regional General Welfare", 1
VERMONr L. REV. 23, 40-41 (1976). The "regional general welfare" approach used by the
New Jersey Supreme Court, however, raises the issue of the proper function of the
judiciary in deciding the scope of regional general welfare. See Payne, Delegation
Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently modified Mt.
Laurel in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, -N.J.-, 371 A.2d 1192
(1977). Oakwood held, contrary to Mt. Laurel, that the court should not determine the
regional area to be provided for or designate the exact number of units to be built. See 29
LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIG. 20 (No. 3, 1977).
40. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
41. See note 34 supra.
42. The standing problem in a zoning case has caused some controversy when the
complaining party is not a resident of or does not own land in the community. The
federal courts have held that without this requisite there is no "injury in fact." See
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See generally Note, Alternatives to Warth v.
Seldin: The Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusionary Zoning Scheme, 11 URBAN
L. ANN. 223 (1976). Another method of asserting standing is for the plaintiff to show that
the interest he is trying to protect is within the "zone of interests" protected by the
constitutional guarantee in question. Here again the courts have not allowed an expan-
sive application in zoning cases. The Supreme Court has chosen to rest the standing
decision on whether or not a specific project site had been selected. If a particular site
had been chosen the court would find "injury in fact." See Park View Heights Corp. v.
City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
In the Arlington Heights case the Court found standing both for the Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation and for a prospective resident of the housing project.
The corporation had clearly been injured by the defendant's action and the prospective
resident had asserted a specific grievance, focused on the specific project. Village of
1977]
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that a racially discriminatory motivation must be shown. Because of
the difficulty in proving motivation4 3 the Court agreed that the inquiry
may encompass circumstantial evidence which is only indirectly pro-
bative of discriminatory motivation. 44 The clear implication, therefore,
is that the analysis contemplated by the Court is the same as that used
in cases following the Lackawanna decision.45 However, by requiring
a finding of racial motivation, the Court foreclosed any expansion of
the discriminatory effect standard which would impose an affirmative
duty on municipalities to remedy existing segregation in the housing
market. 46
Although this holding does not create any drastic changes in the
practical aspects of challenging exclusionary zoning practices, the
Court stated in dicta a proposition that may have far-reaching ramifica-
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977). See
Note, Alternatives to Warth v. Seldin: The Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusio-
nary Zoning Scheme, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 223 (1976).
43. Whether or not a court should try to determine the motivation behind a legislative
action has been the subject of much controversy. The arguments against looking to
motivation deal with the difficulties of ascertaining motivation and the futility of striking
down an otherwise good law. Others have simply felt that such a review represents
improper judicial inquiry. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95. Arguing in favor of
judicial review of motivation, Brest suggests four points: 1) Governments may not
constitutionally attempt to obtain certain objectives, i.e., discrimination on the basis of
race or the control of religious belief; 2) An illicit objective may be a determinative factor
in a decision, and to the extent that it is, it should not have been considered; 3) The
legislature is the forum which assesses the "[u]tility and fairness of a decision. And,
since the decisionmaker has assigned an incorrect value to a relevant factor, the party
[adversely affected] has been deprived of his only opportunity for a full, proper assess-
ment;" 4) If the complaining party can establish that an illicit objective played a part in
the decision the action should be invalidated unless there is clear proof that the illicit
consideration was not determinative of the outcome. Id. at 95. Brest's fourth point does
not seem to lend support to the notion of judicial review of motivation. See Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205
(1970).
44. "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor
demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may
be available." The Court directs review to the "historical background" and notes that it
"may shed some light on the decisionmaker's purposes." Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
45. The "historical background" inquiry enunciated by the Court is the same as the
"historical context" analysis approved of in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967),
and relied on in Lackawanna. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
46. The Court limited the possible expansion of the discriminatory effect standard
which resulted from the language involved. This language left open an opportunity to
pull away from any inquiry into motivation such as that used in the Lackawanna
decision. It became evident that the courts were beginning to seize that opportunity to
expand the discriminatory effect standard. See note 34 supra.
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tions. The Supreme Court suggested that even when discriminatory
motive is proved, the act in question may nevertheless escape condem-
nation by shifting the burden of proof to the municipality to show that
the same action would have taken place in the absence of discriminat-
ory motivation.47
This shift in the burden of proof was first developed in Washington
v. Davis48 when the Supreme Court found that strict scrutiny review
does not always apply where race is concerned. In that case the
Supreme Court relied on a series of earlier jury selection cases49 and
suggested that even when a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose
is established, the state can rebut a presumption of unconstitutionality
by showing that the disproportionate result was a product of "permiss-
ible racially neutral" actions.50
Although the Court in Arlington Heights found that the plaintiffs
failed to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, they took
the opportunity to emphasize the notion that a racially discriminatory
purpose does not necessarily constitute a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause.5'
47. The Court stated:
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially dis-
criminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of the chal-
lenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden
of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermiss-
ible purpose not been considered. If this were established, the complaining party in
a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to
improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there
would be no justification for judicial interference with the challenged decision.
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 n.21 (1977),
citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle , 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
48. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
49. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346
(1970); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
50. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972), cited in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
51. See note 47 and accompanying text supra. It can be argued that the course taken
in Mt. Healthy and Arlington Heights is distinct from that suggested in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Davis analysis is drawn from jury selection cases where
the proof needed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination is minimal. The
standard of justification is used to rebut the presumption of discriminatory purpose. In
Mt. Healthy a discriminatory motivation is assumed and the standard of justification is
used to offer alternative reasons for accepting the governmental action. While this
distinction is a clear one, it does not seem to break down the line of reasoning which ties
the two approaches together. Both cases offer an alternative to the strict scrutiny review
under equal protection. The Davis approach allows the state to rebut a prima facie case
of discrimination where it appears that the plaintiff's case was too easily established to
invoke strict scrutiny. The Mt. Healthy approach, which was extended to equal protec-
19771
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In doing so, the Supreme Court relied on Mt. Healthy School District
Board of Education v. Doyle.12 In Mt. Healthy, the Court held that
although the plaintiff's exercise of his first amendment right of free
speech had played a substantial part in the school board's decision not
to rehire him, this alone did not necessarily amount to a constitutional
violation. The Supreme Court allowed the school board to prove that
the teacher "would not have been rehired in any event." 53
In reaching the decision in Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court em-
ployed a causation test54 which permits the defendant to offer alterna-
tive justifications for allegedly discriminatory actions. By suggesting
that this test be applied in a zoning context, the Court recognized that
there are other interests involved in municipal zoning and planning
decisions which may override discriminatory motivation. The Court,
however, failed to indicate precisely what alternative justifications
would be sufficient to enable the municipality's actions to escape
condemnation. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the establishment of a
consistent growth and developmental policy would aid a municipality
in effectuating a discriminatory zoning plan.55
The Supreme Court in Arlington Heights developed a standard of
review under the equal protection clause which requires the plaintiff to
establish a case of discrimination that can only be satisfied in the most
blatant instances. This doctrine presents a dangerous standard of judi-
cial nonintervention which could give deference to planned discrimina-
tion review in Arlington Heights, is yet further recognition of the fact that areas exist in
which strict scrutiny should not be used even though racial discrimination was shown.
52. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
53. Id. at 286.
54. This causation test was previously used in criminal procedure cases. Parker v.
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (although there had been an involuntary confession,
a guilty plea a monthlater would be viewed as voluntary). In Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court assumed that defendant's arrest had been unlawful, but
found that "[tihe connection between the arrest and the statement [given several days
later] had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' " Id. at 491, citing Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (the case concerned the effect of illegal wiretap-
ping on the rest of the government's evidence). In Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), the Court explained that such a causation test was
needed in order to protect "against the invasion of constitutional rights without com-
manding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights." Id.
at 287.
Thus the causation test allows the defendant an additional chance to maintain its
decision or action despite the impermissible consideration in the decisionmaking
process.
55. It is quite possible that a well-planned buffer policy as used in Arlington Heights
would be sufficient to justify an exclusionary act.
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tion. Such a result not only presents almost insurmountable barriers to
injured parties, but also impliedly approves of the carefully planned
segregated community.
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